"Contractual Chains"

"Opening the Brown Box: Production Responses to Environmental Regulation", w/ Lakshmi Naaraayanan (LBS) and Kunal Sachdeva (Rice University)

“Deterrence of Unwanted Behavior: a Theoretical and Experimental Investigation”

"Estimating the Effects of Political Pressure on the Fed: A Narrative Approach with New Data"

“Experts & Experiments”

"How People Use Statistics"

“Financing the Global Shift to Electric Mobility"

"Learning from Viral Content"

“Preventing Runs with Redemption Fees”

“Choosing and Using Information in Evaluation Decisions”

"Heterogeneous Beliefs and Stock Market Fluctuations"

"The Worker-Job Surplus"

"Comparative statics with adjustment costs and the le Chatelier principle"

"Worker Representatives"

Location: IZA, Conference Room, Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 9
Time: 13:00-14:00 CET

Abstract:
We study the descriptive and substantive representation of workers
through worker representatives, focusing on the selection of
German works council representatives and their impact on worker
outcomes. Becoming a professional representative leads to
substantial wage gains for the elected, concentrated among bluecollar workers. Representatives are positively selected in terms of
pre-election earnings and person fixed effects. They are more likely
to have undergone vocational training, show greater interest in
politics, and lean left politically compared to the employees they
represent; blue-collar workers are close to proportionally
represented among works councilors. Drawing on a retirement-IV
strategy and event-study designs around council elections, we find
that blue-collar representatives reduce involuntary separations,
consistent with blue-collar workers placing stronger emphasis on job
security.

"Students' Selection vs. Adaption: The Role of Personality and Preferences"

Location: IZA, Conference Room, Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 9
Time: 14:15-15:30 CET

Abstract:
This study aims to comprehensively explore the interaction of
personality/preferences and education decisions. Based on a
tailored sample of more than 8,000 university students, we analyze
students’ sorting into majors based on their personality/
preferences, and we investigate if and how the education
environment affects personality/preferences. Additionally, we
examine the matching quality of students to majors based on their
personality/preferences profiles.

tba

"Multidimensional Screening with Rich Consumer Data"

"A Macroeconomic Perspektive on Taxing Multinational Enterprises"

Location: Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)
Time: 12:15-13:30 CET

Abstract:
We study the macroeconomic consequences of tax policies designed
to international profit shifting by multinational enterprises (MNEs)
using a model that emphasizes transfer pricing of intangible capital.
We prove analytically that such policies would reduce MNEs’
intangible investment, reducing output both at home and abroad.
We then quantify the effects of the OECD’s proposed reforms:
reallocating the rights to tax MNEs’ profits to the countries where
they sell their products; and a minimum global income tax. These
policies would reduce profit shifting by more than two-thirds, but
would also reduce output in all regions of the global economy.

tba

"Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Hidden Savings and Liquidity Constraints"

Location: Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)
Time: 12:15-13:30 CET

Abstract:
We study optimal unemployment insurance in a dynamic
environment with heterogeneous agents, who face potentially
binding liquidity constraints, and where neither search effort nor
wealth is observable. In the constrained efficient allocation, the
poorest agents always search, while richer agents start searching
only after a spell of inactivity or not at all. Consumption levels of
committed searchers are optimally declining in duration. We
characterize various (Ricardian equivalent) implementations of the
constrained optimum, including one that features a lump-sum layoff
payment upon separation, zero benefits during unemployment, and
duration-dependent re-employment taxes. By contrast, a policy with
constant benefits during unemployment, which has been shown to
be optimal in settings without liquidity constraints, is severely
suboptimal in our framework.

tba

"Sequential Mechanisms for Evidence Acquisition"

Location: Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)
Time: 16:30-17:45 CET

Abstract:
We consider optimal mechanisms for inducing agents to acquire
costly evidence in a setting where a principal has a good to allocate
that all agents want. We show that optimal mechanisms are
necessarily sequential in nature and have a threshold structure.
Agents with higher costs of obtaining evidence and/or worse
distributions of value for the principal are asked for evidence later, if
at all. We derive these results in part by exploiting the relationship
between the Lagrangian for this problem and the classic Weitzman
(1979) “Pandora’s box” problem.

"tba"

Location: Juridicum, Faculty Lounge (0.036)
Time: 16:00-17:00 CET

Abstract:
tba

"Design on Matroids: Diversity vs. Meritocracy"

tba

Mediated Renegotiation

 "Tail Risk Neglect: A Reality Check", with Valentin Stockerl