Bonn Winter 2023/2024
briq Applied Microeconomics Workshop
"Micro Risks and (Robust) Pareto Improving Policies"
“The Costly Wisdom of Inattentive Crowds”
briq Applied Microeconomics Workshop
A new theory of credit lines (with evidence)
briq Applied Microeconomics Workshop
"Robust Bayesian Estimation and Inference for Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models"
briq Applied Microeconomics Workshop: “Identification and Inference for Pure Random Coefficients Models with Limited Consideration”
"Culture and Marriage: Lessons from German Reunification"
"Voter Learning, Unidimensional Ideology, and Polarization"
"How do Migrants and Natives Search for Jobs"
"Dynamic Contracting with Flexible Monitoring"
Bonn Applied Microeconomics Workshop: “The Child Penalty Atlas”
A Measure of Behavioral Heterogeneity
In this paper we propose a novel way to measure behavioral heterogeneity in a population of stochastic individuals. Our measure is choice-based; it evaluates the probability that, over a randomly selected menu, the sampled choices of two sampled individuals differ. We provide axiomatic foundations for this measure and a decomposition result that separates heterogeneity into its intra- and inter-personal
components.
briq Applied Microeconomics Workshop
“Sustainable Investing and Public Goods Provision"
A mechanism-design approach to property rights
We propose a framework for studying the optimal design of rights relating to the control of an economic resource - which we broadly refer to as property rights. An agent makes an investment decision, affecting her valuation for the resource, and then participates in a trading mechanism chosen by a principal in a sequentially rational fashion, leading to a hold-up problem. A designer - who would like to incentivize efficient investment and whose preferences may differ from those of the principal - can endow the agent with a menu of rights that determine the agent's set of outside options in the interaction with the principal. We characterize the optimal rights as a function of the designer's and the principal's objectives, and the investment technology. We find that optimal rights typically differ from a classical property right giving the agent full control over the resource. In particular, we show that the optimal menu requires at most two types of rights, including an option-to-own, which grants the agent control over the resource upon paying a pre-specified price.
Micro Theory Seminar: "Time Trumps Quantity in the Market for Lemons"
"The Economics of Legal Uncertainty"
Micro Theory Seminar: "How Competition Shapes Information in Auctions"
Bonn Applied Microeconomics Seminar: “Making Sense: An Esteem-based Model of Collective Delusions”
"Defusing Leverage: Liquidity Management and Labor Contracts"
Micro Theory Seminar
briq Applied Microeconomics Workshop
briq Applied Microeconomics Workshop
briq Applied Microeconomics Workshop
"Trade, Voting, and ESG Policies: Theory and Evidence"
briq Applied Microeconomics Workshop
"Access to Credit, Exports and Product Quality"
"Informing agents amidst biased narratives"
"The Spatial and Distributive Implications of Working-from-home: A General Equilibrium Model"
"The Effect of Ambiguity Aversion on Belief Elicitation"
"Deposits, Banks, and Macroprudential Policy"
"The simple life? Heterogenity in income risk and household portfolios"
"Monetary Policy and Spatial Structure"
"Distributional Dynamics"
Title: tba