Why people vote for “populists” - researchers from the University of Mannheim report Press release: Why people vote for “populists”

Unlike business managers, politicians do not receive bonuses for good performance during their term of office. What incentives drive the government to satisfy the electorate? “Politicians from established parties don't want to be voted out of office - least of all by populists. With our research model, we show how effective the ‘populist threat’ is,” says Nicolas Bonneton from the EPoS Economic Research Center.

Swing voters know the shortcomings of populists
Even though they are aware of the possible competence deficiencies of populists with no experience of government, rational voters can sometimes find it useful to vote for a populist. These disadvantages are priced in as if in a cost-benefit analysis. Established politicians are hit particularly hard by the “punishment” from these
voters. If establishment politicians are sufficiently afraid of voters, it may induce them to focus on the wishes of the broad electorate rather than sticking to ideologically based goals.

Populist “warning” in Germany
“In the short to medium term, this populist pressure from dissatisfied swing voters in Germany is more of a warning - this is especially true by international comparison,” say the researchers. “The probability of replacing a government led by established parties with one led by populists is relatively low in Germany. Our proportional representation electoral system means that establishment parties, if they are united, can keep populist parties out of government even when those receive an increasing vote share. As a consequence, we are hardly seeing any changes of course on the issues of immigration and nuclear power, i.e. issues that many voters view differently to the government according to representative population surveys.”

Immigration policy in Denmark
The situation is different in Denmark, for example. Here, the Social Democratic Party has been following the broad shift in public opinion for years and is pursuing a restrictive immigration policy. “The example of Denmark shows how the threat of being replaced by a right-wing populist party can influence the policies of an established party,” say the authors. In Germany, too, the populist threat to established parties will increase in the long term if dissatisfaction with the course of the governing parties increases accordingly.

The model
The research of the EPoS Economic Research Center examines the incentives of politicians and voters in a formal equilibrium model with rational voters. The focus is on the conditions under which an electoral strategy that potentially favors a populist party is optimal for voters. The behavior of swing voters was examined in contrast to core supporters of a party. The model thus explains both the strong increase and decrease in support for populist parties.